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The African telecommunications union: A Pan-African approach to tele-
communications reform 
 
PATRICIA K. McCORMICK, Department of Radio, TV and Film, The John H. Johnson School of Communications, How-




Abstract     This article examines the organisational structure and strategic plans of the African Telecommunica-
tions Union (ATU). Although the ATU has been restructured to include private telecommunications entities as asso-
ciate members, it remains essentially an inter-governmental agency. The article assesses the benefits of a regional 
approach to telecommunications reform and proposes that regional economic organisations replace the nation states 
as members of the ATU. Although the goals of the ATU, as articulated in its strategic plans are laudable, clearly de-
fined benchmarks and specific strategies to achieve them are needed to make the organisation more effective. 
 





If the wealth and socio-economic health of a re-
gion is defined by its ability to participate in the 
networked economy, Africa is indeed impover-
ished. In an era of accelerated technological 
change, Africa's technological dependency and 
underdevelopment utterly impairs its ability to 
compete in the global economy. This is evi-
denced by it comprising less than one percent of 
global trade (Oshikoya & Hussain, 1999). The 
African continent grows increasingly marginal-
ized as technological advancements in other are-
as of the world are accompanied by new patterns 
of dependency in Africa. This situation is further 
aggravated by the policies of the predatory, neo-
colonial state (Castells, 2000). The capital-
intensive nature of the sector, coupled with Afri-
ca's rent position in terms of technology and its 
consequent inability to control costs, also places 
unattainable demands on the continent. Africa is 
the most indebted region in the world in per capi-
ta terms with nearly half of its population sub-
sisting on less than one US dollar per day (Afri-
can Telecommunications Union (ATU), 2001a). 
As the only region of the world where poverty 
levels are projected to increase, Africa can ill-
afford to invest in the expansion of telecommu-
nication services. Although the number of tele-
phone lines has increased in absolute terms on 
the continent, the growth rate needs to be much 
greater to have a positive impact and outpace 
population growth, which at around three percent 
is the highest in the world (Oshikoya & Hussain, 
1999). 
To remedy this situation, the African Tele-
communications Union (ATU) has articulated its 
mission to effectively promote the rapid devel-
opment of information communications technol-
ogies in Africa in order to achieve universal ac-
cess and full inter-country connectivity (African 
Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1999). The 
ATU is not only cognizant of the vital role the 
telecommunications sector plays in promoting 
socio-economic development, but it also recog-
nizes the need to develop telecommunications 
networks and services in a concerted, planned 
and integrated manner (African Telecommunica-
tions Union (ATU), 1999). The potential for co-
operation between states is arguably highest 
when the issue at stake reinforces an interde-
pendent relationship among the states involved, 
so collaboration on an issue-specific area, such 
as telecommunications, may offer better potential 
for success than macro-level schemes (Akinyemi, 
2001). This article thus examines the organisa-
tional structure and strategic plans of the ATU, 
as well as the challenges it faces in achieving its 
goals and objectives to facilitate telecommunica-
tions policy reform and related infrastructure and 
service developments in its member states. This 
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article assesses the efforts of the ATU for it is 
important that this continental organisation, in its 
various endeavours, actually achieves tangible 
results and is not merely a Pan-African paper 
tiger. 
METHODOLOGY 
Since the research is interdisciplinary in na-
ture with several contemporary, interrelated is-
sues being examined, this work employs the case 
study, which draws upon multiple data sources to 
develop converging lines of inquiry or triangula-
tion to investigate a specific phenomenon. A ma-
jor strength of case study data collection is its use 
of several different sources of evidence. This 
study, based on field work conducted in Kenya in 
the summer of 2002, draws on three primary 
sources of evidence: documentation, archival 
records, and elite interviews. Documentation 
sources include, among other references, policy 
and legal documents from the ATU. In the pro-
cess of gathering data, interviews were conduct-
ed with officials of the ATU, including the secre-
tary general, as well as others intimately in-
volved in the telecommunications sector. These 
interviews, while open-ended in nature, followed 
a specific set of questions concerning telecom-
munications policy and infrastructure develop-
ments in Africa.  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN AFRICA: 
AN OVERVIEW 
Africa, with a population of some 840 million, is 
one of the least networked or computerized re-
gions in the world. The continent claims 12 per-
cent of the world's population, but only 2 percent 
of the world's telephones, which are unevenly 
distributed both within and between countries. 
Eighty percent of the lines are concentrated in 
just eight countries, and in some states tele-
density rates are as low as one telephone line per 
1000 people (African Telecommunications Un-
ion (ATU), 2001a, p. 2). Paradoxically, although 
Africa encompasses thirty-four of the world's 
least developed countries, it boasts some of the 
highest costs for international calls and the laying 
of fixed telephone lines. It is estimated that the 
average cost per line in the region is over 
US$4500, which is more than three times the in-
dustry average of US$1500 (Oshikoya & 
Hussain, 1999), and results in prohibitive sub-
scription costs. Such institutional inefficiency 
coupled with inadequate human resources and 
maintenance problems that derive from an ab-
sence of common operating standards, proper 
maintenance procedures, and standardized 
equipment, together account in part for the de-
mise of fixed line telephony in Africa. 
This situation demands that African states re-
structure and reform the telecommunications sec-
tor and invest in mobile services in order to pro-
mote network efficiencies and extend the infra-
structure to the rural populace. Despite compris-
ing the majority of Africans, the rural population 
has yet to benefit from the deployment of new 
communication technologies, since investment in 
the more profitable urban and international mar-
kets has been at the expense of providing access 
to rural and low-income users. Developments in 
the telecommunications sector, including the rap-
id growth of pre-paid cellular phone services, 
have remained an urban phenomenon as service 
providers argue that it is not economically feasi-
ble to roll out a network to cover an entire coun-
try. The International Telecommunications Un-
ion (ITU) (2004) estimates that less than half the 
population in Sub-Saharan Africa was covered 
by a mobile signal in 2003. Although Africa's 
mobile market has been the fastest growing of 
any region over the past 5 years, raising its mo-
bile penetration to 6.2 per 100 inhabitants at the 
end of 2003, twice the fixed rate, this still repre-
sents the lowest mobile penetration of any region 
(International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 
2004). Furthermore, the fact that rural and urban 
telephony statistics are not disaggregated from 
national statistics reflects and fosters the lack of 
priority accorded the development of this sector 
in rural areas, as figures of urban growth conceal 
the often stagnant picture of rural telecommuni-
cations development (Shanmugavelan & 
Warnock, 2004). Universal access policies and 
mechanisms, which ensure that profits from the 
lucrative sectors are used to provide service in 
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rural and economically deprived areas, have not 
been instituted. Rural coverage requirements 
must be a stated requirement of license obliga-
tions and must be enforced, since African states 
are likely to expand the telecommunications sec-
tor through a wireless platform. 
It is important to note, though, that while 
mobile services carry relatively lower fixed net-
work costs than wire line networks, especially in 
areas of low population density, the cost of mo-
bile-based equipment and calls generally contin-
ue to be higher than fixed-line systems, so mo-
bile services may still be beyond the economic 
reach of rural people. To facilitate mobile access, 
a single cell phone and thus its associated costs is 
often shared among family members or friends. 
Also employed to reduce costs are beep-calls, 
that is when one places a call to a mobile phone 
owner and then ends the call before it incurs 
charges as a way to request the mobile phone 
owner to return a call or as a pre-arranged mes-
sage (“I’ll beep when I’m leaving”) (Chango, 
2004). To address this and other cost-saving 
practices, some companies are now providing a 
free ‘Call Me’ text message together with the 
owner's phone number as well as removing the 
time constraint to buy air-time or recharge credit 
on prepaid packages (Chango, 2004). It remains 
vitally important to employ competition and reg-
ulation to secure the economic viability of mo-
bile services as an option to increase the tele-
phone penetration or tele-density rate in rural ar-
eas, since, according to the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU) (2004, p. 24), the 
average African expenditure of US$27 per month 
for mobile services is more than half the official 
average African per capita income, testimony to 
the existing urban clientele. 
Mobile service providers have also yet to in-
vest heavily in mobile data services built over the 
existing GSM platform, which enables slow and 
medium-speed Internet access (Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation, 2002). There 
are various advanced technologies emerging that 
offer higher-speed access to portable Internet us-
ers, but mobile operators in Africa have largely 
confined themselves to the voice market because 
they are uncertain of the financial viability of 
mobile data, since much of the information on 
the Internet is irrelevant to the needs of the peo-
ple in rural African communities and the com-
mercial character of the Internet embodies a cul-
ture that, too, is not germane to the African envi-
ronment. High levels of Short Message Service 
(SMS) usage in Africa have been adversely af-
fected by the prevalence of pre-paid users; how-
ever, as the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) (2004) notes, if African users are 
choosing the pre-paid option because it is less 
expensive than subscription, they may choose to 
send SMS if they are cheaper than voice calls. 
Although these services are just emerging in Af-
rica, they may fare well in the future since such a 
notable market gap exists in service offerings. 
In this context, though, one should note that 
African states are exceedingly dependent on sat-
ellites with more than 95 percent of international 
traffic carried by satellite in the majority of coun-
tries, yet it is increasingly difficult for them to 
lease capacity on the satellites above Africa for 
they are heavily subscribed (Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Organisation, 2002). As the 
Regional African Satellite Communications Or-
ganisation (RASCOM) prepares to launch a sat-
ellite to meet some of the needs of the continent, 
it is faced with the challenge of securing an allo-
cation of orbital space, for ironically, “there are 
an estimated 300 satellites across the equator that 
cuts through Africa yet none of them serves the 
continent” (African Telecommunications Union 
(ATU), 2001a). 
The ATU realizes that to achieve sustainable 
development and create effective regional econ-
omies as well as ensure the fundamental right to 
communicate, it is imperative that Africans, who 
do not live in the capital cities, but in rural com-
munities, are provided with telecommunication 
services; otherwise the existing inequities in the 
distribution of power and wealth become increas-
ingly entrenched. The ATU recognizes the pre-
ponderance of the problems and seeks to redress 
the rural–urban divide in both Internet and te-
lephony access through forging public–private 
partnerships in an effort to develop the telecom-
munications or information communications sec-
tor. 
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THE CREATION AND STRUCTURE OF 
THE ATU 
The ATU is a specialized agency or organ of the 
recently created African Union (AU), which was 
officially formed in July 2001 to replace the Or-
ganization of African Unity (OAU). The ATU is 
based in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, but due to the war there 
has been temporarily moved to Nairobi, Kenya. 
The ATU was established with 26 member states 
as signatories in December 1999 as the successor 
to the Pan-African Telecommunications Union 
(PATU). To ensure that the ATU is more than a 
mere change of names, it employs the instru-
ments of its constitution, convention, and admin-
istrative regulations (African Telecommunica-
tions Union (ATU), 1999). The ATU was also 
structurally altered to include a General Secretar-
iat, comprising a secretary general who serves as 
the chief executive officer, and a management 
team, composed of the directors of the develop-
ment and technical sectors. The most notable 
change, though, is the creation of a new class of 
membership—the associate member—in an ef-
fort to bridge the differences between the public 
and private sectors in both policies and opera-
tions (Gideon, 2000). 
In the process of promoting the accessibility 
and use of information technologies, the ATU 
also recognizes the need for African states to 
create strong, though lean, independent regula-
tors. Because many African states have a weak 
regulatory mechanism and no clear policy or leg-
islation regarding the telecommunications sector, 
the ATU assists in policy formulation and advis-
es and oversees the financial and technical regu-
latory plans of its member states. Many govern-
ments, in their haste to promulgate telecommuni-
cations laws in response to, principally, external 
pressure, have failed to establish an institutional 
mechanism to continuously review sector policy 
(Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisa-
tion, 2002). This situation can be remedied as the 
ATU seeks to design policies and legislation that 
create a more liberal and competitive telecom-
munications sector that accommodates, if not 
mandates, a greater role for the private and non-
profit sectors and private–public partnerships. 
The ATU supports the creation of well-structured 
public–private partnerships in its member states, 
because it is thought that such partnerships can 
provide the resources to build a regional tele-
communications infrastructure. In its effort to 
construct public–private partnerships, member-
ship in the ATU includes government and inde-
pendent telecommunication regulators as well as 
public and private service providers. 
Associate Members 
Any private entity involved in the information 
communications sector, which is registered in a 
country that is a member of the ATU, may apply 
for associate membership. Entities that are regis-
tered in an African country that is not a member 
of the ATU, which is, generally speaking, a 
country that is not a member of the AU, are still 
eligible for membership. The ATU thus has the 
potential to comprise hundreds of associate 
members, for such membership embraces a va-
riety of categories, including operators, service 
providers, ICT vendors, and industrial, scientific, 
and educational organizations. Operators may be 
fixed network operators or mobile network oper-
ators, cable operators or satellite operators. Ser-
vice providers may be Internet service providers, 
application service providers, television broad-
casters or radio broadcasters. ICT vendors in-
clude companies that may provide, among other 
services, operational support systems, billing sys-
tem software, and fixed or mobile network tech-
nology. A diverse range of organisations may 
also apply for associate membership, including 
consulting agencies, publishers or news media, 
universities, investment banks, and regional tele-
communication organisations, such as the Tele-
communications Regulators Association of 
Southern Africa (African Telecommunications 
Union (ATU), 2001b). 
Through participation in various activities 
undertaken by the ATU, such as conferences, 
seminars, workshops, and colloquia, associate 
members may contribute to the development of 
policy, regulation, network standards and inter-
connection rates. Associate members may nomi-
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nate and be nominated as chairpersons of the 
Technical and Development Conference, but 
may only attend the Conference of Plenipoten-
tiaries and Council of the Union as observers 
without voting privileges (African Telecommu-
nications Union (ATU), 2001b). 
Organisational structure of the ATU 
The ATU is composed of five principal constitu-
ents: the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the 
Administrative Council, the Technical and De-
velopment Conference, the General Secretariat, 
and Non-Permanent Units. The Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries (CPL), the supreme policy or-
gan of the ATU, is attended by Ministers of 
Communications who meet every 4 years to ap-
prove strategic plans and budgets on a 4-year cy-
cle. The CPL also holds authority to revise, as 
necessary, the ATU constitution and convention, 
and elect both the secretary general and members 
of the Administrative Council. The Administra-
tive Council, which meets on an annual basis, is 
responsible for the implementation of the strate-
gic plans and approves the annual work pro-
grammes and budgets and also generates all 
memoranda of understanding with regional and 
global partners (African Telecommunications 
Union (ATU), 2001b). The ATU has signed co-
operation agreements with, for example, the In-
tergovernmental Authority on Development, the 
Regional African Satellite Communications Or-
ganisation, and selected regional economic or-
ganisations such as the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa. The Technical and 
Development Conference sets standards and 
guidelines and essentially serves as the forum for 
exchange between public and private sector 
stakeholders on a variety of policy, regulatory, 
technical and financial issues. 
ATU Budget 
Annual contributions from the member states and 
the associate members, the amount of which is 
based on the budget adopted by the Council and 
according to a scale adopted by the CPL, consti-
tute the primary financial basis of the ATU. Con-
tributions for associate members are assessed on 
the scale of contribution of the member state in 
which it is registered. There are three contribu-
tion levels for associate members: corporate-gold 
is equivalent to one-quarter of the member state's 
contribution; corporate-silver is equal to one-
eighth and corporate-bronze one-sixteenth of the 
member state's contribution (African Telecom-
munications Union (ATU), 2001b). These are 
minimum contribution levels, determined in part 
on the size of the company or firm in question, 
and all members are, of course, encouraged to 
contribute additional assets to further strengthen 
the financial base of the ATU (African Tele-
communications Union (ATU), 2000). Other fi-
nancial resources include extra-budgetary contri-
butions and donations approved by the Council, 
voluntary donations, sundry income from ser-
vices rendered, and income generated by the 
Business Unit (African Telecommunications Un-
ion (ATU), 1999). When arrears of contributions 
are paid in excess of the debts that the ATU owes 
to staff and third parties, the surplus funds will 
be employed to finance work programme activi-
ties (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 
2001b). 
One of the primary factors that constrained 
the PATU's ability to succeed was inadequate 
financial support from many of its members. The 
ATU, too, is hampered in its endeavours due to 
membership arrears. In April 2001, the General 
Secretariat presented to the Council budgetary 
estimates for the financial year 2001–2002 in the 
amount of US$833,635, holding to the ceiling of 
the previous year (African Telecommunications 
Union (ATU), 2001c). The limited number of 
ATU staff and the trend of low membership con-
tribution necessitated this prudent approach to 
financial management. Although the Council ap-
proved the budget, it also recommended that the 
secretary general appeal to those member states 
that owe the ATU a considerable amount of ar-
rears of contribution. While external donors 
could assist in nurturing the development of the 
ATU, such support could not be provided indefi-
nitely and dependence on foreign aid, which 
Nkrumah (1963) describes as one of the more 
subtle forms of neo-colonialism, is best avoided. 
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Thus it is imperative that African states be finan-
cially forthcoming. 
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESS OF THE ATU  
Although membership fees are small in compari-
son to what most states spend on their own secu-
rity or military apparatus, financial constraints 
seriously hamper the efforts of the ATU because 
governments fail to pay the arrears on their dues. 
Since key administrative appointments are often 
highly politicised, governments are generally 
more willing to pay their fees to regional or con-
tinental associations when the secretary general 
and other top staff are from their state or the in-
stitution is headquartered in their country (Dad-
dieh, 1995). Unfortunately, the ATU is financial-
ly dependent on governments for it remains es-
sentially an inter-governmental organisation. As 
of August 2002 the ATU consisted of merely 10 
associate members.1 The ATU needs to provide 
clear incentives for its existing members to pay 
their fees as well as conduct extensive outreach 
to build a base of private participants or its de-
mise is certain. 
Like other Pan-African approaches, the fun-
damental issue that must be addressed concerns 
representation. Having nation-states as members 
of the ATU with full voting privileges constitutes 
a top–down approach to telecommunications de-
velopment. Although the World Telecommunica-
tions Advisory Council recommends that the tel-
ecommunications sector be raised to the highest 
political level, the general public too needs to be 
informed of the issues and the ramifications of 
decisions to stimulate policy discussion and 
make politicians more responsive to their needs 
(Jensen, 1995). The ATU cannot claim to repre-
sent users for they have no voice and no vote in 
non-democratic and politically unstable states, 
which continue to dominate Africa. Thus, despite 
the ATU's attempts to create a transparent, par-
ticipatory structure that is accountable to its 
members, it is difficult to see how the ATU can 
be an enduring democratic institution if its con-
stituent member countries lack good governance 
and strong constitutional rights for its citizenry. 
As Mbaku (1999) writes, each new set of po-
litical elites, whether they are civilian or military, 
suspend or discard existing constitutions and 
draft new ones to legitimise their rule. These 
same African rulers zealously defend their sover-
eignty and lack the political will and commit-
ment to subordinate domestic political and eco-
nomic interests to supranational institutions with 
long-term regional integration goals (Ibeike-
Jonah, 2001). They often fail to support regional-
ism and South–South cooperation because they 
are politically and economically aligned with 
leaders of the G-8 as they seek to reap the riches 
of their countries and their international linkages 
for personal profit (Brown, 1996). Daddieh 
(1995) suggests that the absence of sound politi-
cal leadership, coupled with the failure to organ-
ize, nurture and involve the civil society in the 
articulation and implementation of regional poli-
cies, has resulted in ineffectual integration efforts. 
To integrate, African states must essentially be 
deconstructed and the state apparatus recon-
structed to increase popular participation and re-
duce political opportunism. According to Da-
vidson (1994), what is needed is a decolonisation 
of institutions. 
THE POST-COLONIAL AFRICAN STATE 
The colonial state, in its design as an authoritari-
an, exploitative, and repressive structure, failed 
to address issues of public accountability, politi-
cal representation, and constitutionally guaran-
teed civil rights and civil liberties, which meant 
that these attributes of government were not 
transferred to the local political elites. The post-
colonial state is thus not generally representative 
of the majority of its citizens. The colonial state 
with its absence of democratic principals and 
customs became the superstructure upon which 
African political elites constructed a mercenary 
or predatory state, characterised by economic 
mismanagement, social injustice, political insta-
bility, and corruption coupled with personal and 
ethnic loyalties. This situation grew further en-
trenched by African countries’ colonial inher-
itance of the centrist function of the state in the 
development of the economy (Iheduru, 2001). 
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Upon independence many African govern-
ments undertook large-scale development pro-
jects, including management of the telephone 
companies, for which local entrepreneurs, like 
the governments, had insufficient expertise and 
resources. Governments financed and managed 
these projects by borrowing heavily from the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund. 
According to Iheduru (2001), not only were the 
governments incapable of successfully embark-
ing upon such a wide range of activities, the 
large capital transfers enabled the local political 
elites to pillage the state treasury while providing 
a façade of national development. The resultant 
economic mismanagement and waste, and the 
consequential financial and political crisis, which 
spanned the continent by the late 1970s, engen-
dered the restructuring of the national economies 
(Iheduru, 2001). 
By the mid-1980s most African states were 
engaged in externally designed structural adjust-
ment programmes because the Bretton Woods 
institutions and other bilateral development aid 
agencies required economic restructuring as a 
lending conditionality. By emphasising the mar-
ket allocation of resources, the role of the state 
was to be reduced. The argument advanced was 
that economic structural adjustment, despite its 
short-term negative social consequences, would 
generate the impetus, internally and externally, to 
deconstruct the post-colonial state and its recon-
figuration would serve as an initial step toward 
eventual economic growth in the country 
(Iheduru, 2001). This approach has proven large-
ly unsuccessful, principally because in the pro-
cess of adjustment governments are to adopt pol-
icies that may be economically rational, but are 
irrefutably politically irrational as the state is to 
dismantle its own power through employing in-
stitutional and public sector reforms, which may 
entail divestment, curtailed subsidies for state-
owned enterprises, reduced protectionism and 
trade liberalization. This orthodox paradox also 
presents a quandary for integrative organizations, 
as they too require states to curtail their power in 
favour of a regional institution. 
THEORIES OF INTEGRATION 
There are basically two contrasting approaches to 
integration, the functionalist and the neo-
functionalist. Theorists of both views contend 
that states, which share interests, values, objec-
tives, and experiences, need to concede their 
sovereignty to realize mutual goals. The func-
tionalist approach views integration as an evolu-
tionary process, in which states initially cooper-
ate on specific, apolitical projects and in so doing 
learn to trust one another to the point where a 
political union can evolve. The neo-functionalists 
are principally concerned with the rate of integra-
tion and the creation of structural mechanisms to 
resolve inevitable disputes and divergence of 
views. The neo-functionalists contend that the 
slow pace of the evolutionary approach allows 
for more time for differences to develop and fes-
ter, which would create an impasse in the process 
toward integration, notably because the function-
alists lack the mechanisms to address the numer-
ous complications inherent in moving from non-
political areas of cooperation to political union. 
The neo-functionalists thus favour the creation of 
institutional instruments to respond to political 
and other differences as they arise and to penal-
ize errant members (Akpuru-Aja, 2001). 
THE OAU/AU 
Since the formation of the OAU in 1963, numer-
ous inter-governmental institutions aimed at in-
tegration have been formed, but they are each 
only as strong as their member states empower 
them to be. As African leaders jealously guard 
their state sovereignty, they fail to charge the in-
tegrative organizations with the powers, legal 
and resource-wise, to enforce regional policies at 
the national level. This serious problem is rooted 
in the structure of the OAU, which missed an 
important, initial opportunity to form a political 
federation of African states. The Charter of the 
OAU was itself contradictory or hypocritical in 
that its signatories pledged to defend the sover-
eignty, independence, and territorial integrity of 
Africa's states while simultaneously getting rid of 
all forms of colonialism in Africa, though the 
artifice of the nation-state was its most insidious 
relic. Although the charter of the AU, which was 
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officially formed in July of 2001 to replace the 
OAU, maintains the colonially defined nation-
states, it differs from its predecessor in that it in-
cludes “respect for democratic principles, human 
rights, the rule of law and good governance,” but 
the transference of these words into practice is 
what is at issue (Ibeike-Jonah, 2001). Simply 
signing an agreement achieves naught, as a re-
view of treaties, conference resolutions and pro-
tocols agreed to by African states reveals that 
they have rarely been translated into actions and 
commitments (Akpuru-Aja, 2001). It is impera-
tive, though, given that the telecommunications 
network is a fundamental infrastructure with a 
pervasive effect on the performance and devel-
opment of an economy, that the ATU not befall 
the same fate as other regional initiatives and be-
come another ineffectual Pan-African organiza-
tion. 
CHANGING THE ROLE OF REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS 
For the ATU to be an effective, integrative asso-
ciation, a high degree of uniformity in telecom-
munications policy among African regional or-
ganizations as well as individual member states 
is of critical importance. There are several major 
regional economic associations in Africa, includ-
ing the Economic Community of West Africa 
(ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the East African Community (EAC), 
the Community of Sahel and Saharan States 
(CED-SAD), and the West African Economic 
Community (CEAO), which comprises franco-
phone countries. In an attempt to ensure a uni-
formed approach to telecommunications devel-
opment, regional economic organisations and 
their corresponding telecommunications units 
should be considered, not as associate members, 
but as members of the ATU with all the privileg-
es thereof and thereby replace the individual na-
tion-states as representatives. This structural al-
teration would represent a revolutionary ap-
proach to a continental organisation and advance 
the efforts of the AU toward integration. 
The existing configuration of these regional 
economic organisations, however, requires re-
structuring, because they do not conform to the 
AU's division of the continent and there is over-
lap among the members. Several states in South-
ern Africa, for example, are members of both 
COMESA and SADC. The economic costs of 
participation in two regional organisations and 
the potential for incongruent policies must be 
avoided. The AU has divided the continent into 
five sub-regions: (1) North Africa, comprising 
six states, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Tunisia; (2) West Africa, compris-
ing 14 states, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo; (3) Central Africa, comprising 10 states, 
Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao 
Tome and Principe; (4) East Africa, comprising 
10 states, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Somalia, Sudan, Tanza-
nia, and Uganda, and (5) Southern Africa, com-
prised of six states, Lesotho, Malawi, Republic 
of South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimba-
bwe (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 
2002). Five major regional economic organisa-
tions, based on the AU's design, could thus re-
place the existing associations and avoid dupli-
cate membership. 
In order for this strategy to succeed, though, 
the potential for incongruent policies between 
these groupings must be addressed and the prob-
lem of political leadership, as noted earlier, must 
be remedied through good governance and strong 
constitutional rights. Also, regional integration 
organisations and stratagems must be incorpo-
rated into the educational system or curriculum, 
beginning at the elementary school level. The 
media, too, must focus greater attention on inte-
gration efforts to ensure that the people under-
stand what such schemes are intended to achieve. 
An educated public must then be organized into 
private regional advocacy associations to ensure 
that regional commitments and goals are not 
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subordinated to national ones (Daddieh, 1995). 
Such strategies to promote regional integration 
have not, however, been enlisted to date 
(Ihonvbere, 1999). Leaders must come to realize, 
though, that African states will be further mar-
ginalized if they do not pursue collective self-
reliance and political and economic regional in-
tegration, the long-term benefits of which will 
surpass any immediate costs. 
REGIONAL EFFORTS AND INTEGRA-
TION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Success in macro-level regional schemes have 
been elusive, largely because of the lack of con-
fidence and trust at the interstate level, which 
reflects internal dilemmas within African states 
as the citizens distrust their national governments 
(Akpuru-Aja, 2001). Since cooperation on issue-
specific areas, such as telecommunications, may 
offer better potential for success, these micro-
level measures can assist in constructing confi-
dence in regional organisations. In turn, they can 
become the building blocks for achieving macro-
level regional integration, which is necessary to 
promote socio-economic development goals and 
overcome the balkanisation of the continent dur-
ing the colonial era. The small size of the tele-
communications market caused by low levels of 
economic development, coupled with perceived 
high investment risks and uncertain regulatory 
environments, necessitates that actions in regard 
to this sector be pursued within the framework of 
comprehensive sub-regional plans. An individual 
country's attempts at improving the telecommu-
nications sector will be futile if neighbouring 
states are not exerting similar efforts (Matsebula 
& Simelane, 1996). 
African regional organisations, in recognising 
the important role telecommunications plays in 
development, need to require member states to 
lower, if not eliminate, import tariffs on infor-
mation technology hardware such as computer 
equipment and printers. Communications equip-
ment is often treated as a luxury item and thus 
heavily taxed, because many African states use 
these tariffs as a source of revenue (Oshikoya & 
Hussain, 1999). Telecommunications initiatives 
will only succeed if African governments realize 
that lowering import tariffs will actually serve as 
a greater stimulus for development than as a 
means of revenue generation (Jensen, 1995). 
In addition to tariff reductions, equipment 
and services need to be coordinated as regional 
or group purchases, because costs can be sub-
stantially cut through bulk purchasing. Indeed, as 
Jensen (1995)notes, if a sufficient number of 
countries can agree on a joint procurement policy, 
not only can greater volume discounts be negoti-
ated with suppliers, the operators can benefit 
from sharing the skills developed in operating the 
same equipment. Shared technical standards, too, 
can be developed which will further facilitate 
regional integration. Jensen (1995) suggests that 
it may even be beneficial to establish regional 
telecommunications operators, which could 
achieve sufficient economies of scale to support 
research and development investments and pro-
vide one-stop, uniform availability of interna-
tional and national network services. To date, 
however, neither the ATU nor any of the regional 
economic organizations are engaged in regional 
procurement of equipment or the creation of re-
gional operators, though some have created re-
gional regulatory associations. 
Regional regulatory associations  
The SADC provides a model for the establish-
ment of a regional regulatory organization. In an 
effort to bridge the gap between the formulation 
of regional legislation and policies and effective 
execution at the national level, SADC created the 
Telecommunications Regulators Association of 
Southern Africa (TRASA), the Constitution of 
which became effective on 22 April 1998. Rele-
vant SADC structures also endorsed regional tel-
ecommunications policies and a Model Tele-
communications Bill as a guideline in formulat-
ing national legislation (SADCC-TU, 1999). The 
restructuring of the incumbent national operator, 
specifically the termination of its ability to pre-
scribe the tariffs at which it provides telecommu-
nications services and its powers to make by-
laws and regulation, as well as the establishment 
of an independent regulatory authority and its 
THE AFRICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION  |  PATRICIA McCORMICK 
11!!!!!DIGITALCOMMONS@WSU  |  2005!
duties and powers are the twin foci of the Bill. 
As the formerly self-regulating fixed line mo-
nopoly service providers lose their regulatory 
powers with the creation of independent regula-
tory agencies, the creation of TRASA was con-
sidered essential to facilitate regional telecom-
munications reform and enhance service provi-
sion. 
Membership in TRASA is moreover contin-
gent upon a country's law providing for the es-
tablishment of an autonomous regulatory authori-
ty. Countries, which do not possess independent 
regulators, can participate in the activities of 
TRASA, but do not have voting rights (Southern 
Africa Transport and Communications Commis-
sion (SATCC) (1999a) and Southern Africa 
Transport and Communications Commission 
Technical Unit (SATCC) (1999b)). Members 
share the cost of operating TRASA equally (Tel-
ecommunications Regulators Association of 
Southern Africa (TRASA), 1997). According to 
Article 3 of the TRASA Constitution, the objec-
tives of the organization are to “co-ordinate regu-
latory matters and ... promote the establishment 
and operation of efficient, adequate, and cost-
effective telecommunications networks and ser-
vices in the Southern Africa region which meet 
the diverse needs of customers while being eco-
nomically sustainable” (Telecommunications 
Regulators Association of Southern Africa 
(TRASA), 1997). 
These goals, to varying degrees, are also 
shared by other regional regulatory associations, 
including the West Africa Telecommunication 
Regulators Association (WATRA), which was 
formally inaugurated in May 2002 and has since 
established its secretariat at the Economic Com-
munity of West African States secretariat in Abu-
ja, Nigeria and the Association of Regulation of 
Information and Communications of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (ARICEA), which was launched 
in January 2003 as the regulatory association for 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa. COMESA also seeks to facilitate in-
creased trade relations among its member states 
by supporting the creation of a regional tele-
communications network that is to be built and 
managed by the private company COMTEL 
Communications Ltd (African Telecommunica-
tions Union (ATU), 2003). Both ARICEA and 
WATRA encourage the separation of the roles of 
policy-maker, regulator, and service provider, 
but membership in these organizations, unlike 
TRASA, is not subject to the creation of an inde-
pendent regulator. Rather Article 3 of the 
WATRA Constitution states as one of its objec-
tives, “the establishment of distinct, independent 
and adequately empowered national telecommu-
nications regulatory agencies in countries in the 
sub-regional where such agencies have not been 
created” (West Africa Telecommunications Reg-
ulators’ Association (WATRA), 2002, p. 5). 
Membership in WATRA and ARICEA is thus 
open to the regulators of all countries in the re-
spective sub-regions, be they independent institu-
tions or integrated with the state-owned service 
provider, provided that one regulator represents 
each country. Not only do both of these regional 
regulatory associations lack criteria for member-
ship, they, like TRASA, also lack any power of 
enforcement. 
In pursuance of its objectives, Article 3.2(a) 
of the WATRA Constitution and Article 3.2(b) 
of the ARICEA Constitution state that the regula-
tory association may “deliberate on issues” relat-
ing to telecommunications regulation and the de-
velopment and application of information and 
communication technologies and “make recom-
mendations” to the respective governments of 
member states or other relevant or appropriate 
authorities (Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), 2003; West Africa 
Telecommunications Regulators’ Association 
(WATRA), 2002). The Constitutions fail, how-
ever, to render member states accountable for 
adopting these recommendations. Although Arti-
cle 16 of the ARICEA Constitution and Article 
10.7 of the WATRA Constitution state that sanc-
tions may be imposed against any member that is 
in arrears of its annual dues for more than 1 year 
for reasons other than exceptional circumstances, 
this is an insufficient disciplinary measure, which 
is only employed in cases of financial default. No 
mechanisms have been instituted to penalise a 
state for its failure to adopt recommendations, 
which further policy harmonization in regard to 
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the restructuring of the telecommunications sec-
tor. These regional regulatory associations are 
thus essentially impotent, as they have yet to be 
entrusted with the means of enforcement. 
Although a deficient telecommunications 
system can be considered the foremost non-tariff 
barrier to intra- and extra-African trade, the 
World Bank contends that large infrastructure 
investments will not stimulate regional integra-
tion unless various other regulatory, procedural 
and administrative obstacles that obstruct trade 
are first removed (Daddieh, 1995). Structural ad-
justment programmes, intended to remove these 
barriers, have, however, yet to be designed to 
incorporate regional reform strategies and ex-
plore ways in which responsibility for regional 
disbursement of loans can be shared (Daddieh, 
1995). Adjustment programmes themselves have 
served to reinforce the arbitrary, colonially de-
fined nation-states, without recognising or sup-
porting regional integration structures. The 
World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund continue to treat individual African states 
in isolation and have not begun to strengthen re-
gional cooperation efforts (Brown, 1996). None-
theless, for African states to coordinate and 
streamline their economies, undertake adjustment 
as a single unit, and directly confront the prob-
lem of persistent structural economic dependence, 
economic decisions taken nationally will have to 
take into account regional positions and circum-
stances. African leaders need to accept that some 
decisions, previously made at the individual na-
tional level, will be taken collectively through 
regional institutions and will be binding on all. If 
the international financial institutions possessed 
this understanding, the East African Community 
(EAC) Digital Transmission Project would not 
have been aborted. 
EAC-digital transmission project  
To create a single market and investment area, 
the East African Community, comprising of 
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, sought to inter-
connect the three countries with international 
submarine cable networks. The proposed US$60 
M project, overseen by a steering committee 
composed of the CEOs of the three telephone 
companies, Telkom Kenya, Tanzania Telkom, 
and Uganda Telkom, aimed at introducing state 
of the art technology to accommodate the grow-
ing demand for telecommunications services in 
the region (African Telecommunications Union 
(ATU), 2000). According to Mureithi (1999), the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) committed to 
extend loan facilities for 50 percent of the total 
project costs and intended to cover all foreign 
exchange component costs. The loan package 
was part of risk capital to be taken over directly 
by the project overseers, that is, the telephone 
companies of each country, without the respec-
tive governments’ guarantees. To further assure 
success of the project, the companies urged the 
three governments to extend support by waiving 
duties and taxes, which both Uganda and Kenya 
agreed to do. The East African Development 
Bank was also to provide a loan. The World 
Bank, however, effectively blocked the EAC-
Digital Transmission Project by not allowing 
Tanzania to commit to additional loans in the 
telecommunications sector beyond US$2 M. The 
Bank held Tanzania to the terms of the US$250 
M Telecommunications Restructuring Pro-
gramme, which it signed in 1993 (Mureithi, 
1999). This stance on behalf of the World Bank 
in refusing to refuse to consent to Tanzania's re-
quest to secure additional funds for the telecom-
munications sector not only demonstrates the ri-
gidity and inflexibility of the World Bank, but 
also its utter disregard for viable indigenous pro-
jects to facilitate regional integration. 
Regional monetary and financial institutions 
must be strengthened, as Amin (1997) suggests, 
so that they may serve as substitutes for the IMF 
and World Bank for securing capital. Such initia-
tives are difficult to launch, though, as Japan can 
testify, for in 1997 it offered $100 billion to help 
create an Asian Monetary Fund in order to fi-
nance the required action to alleviate the finan-
cial crisis afflicting East Asia, but was thwarted 
in its efforts by both the IMF and the US Treas-
ury (Stiglitz, 2002). As the only shareholder with 
veto power in the IMF, the US maintains consid-
erable leverage over IMF policies. It would be 
unlikely to retain such a position in an Asian 
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Monetary Fund in which Japan, and possibly 
China, would be the likely major contributors 
and hence whose voices would predominate 
(Stiglitz, 2002). The countries of East Asia did, 
however, later quietly create a more modest ver-
sion of the proposed Asian Monetary Fund under 
the innocuous name of the Chang Mai Initiative 
(Stiglitz, 2002). 
Amin (1997) argues that regional economic 
integration requires corresponding political inte-
gration and the rapprochement of national poli-
cies. Since no economy exists without politics 
and a state, economic globalisation logically re-
quires the construction of a world political sys-
tem of which regional entities are necessary tran-
sitional steps (Amin, 1997). The ATU thus as-
sumes increased importance in this present era, 
which is characterised by a separation between 
the globalised space of capitalism's economic 
management and the national, and regional, 
spaces of its political and social management 
(Amin, 1997). While maintaining a degree of 
flexibility so as to allow member states to pro-
ceed at different paces, the ATU, like the exist-
ing regional organisations, must, however, be 
invested with sufficient powers of enforcement 
to discipline delinquent members and achieve its 
objectives. 
GOALS OF THE ATU  
The ATU has articulated numerous objectives, as 
it seeks to: 
 
a) promote the development and adoption of 
appropriate African telecommunications pol-
icy and regulatory frameworks; 
b) promote the financing and funding of tele-
communications development; 
c) promote programmes for the development of 
the African Information Society; 
d) prepare special programmes for Africa's 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and rural 
telecommunications development; 
e) promote human resources development in the 
field of info-communications; 
f) promote the establishment of info-
communications industries; 
g) co-ordinate the strategies and positions of 
Member States in preparation for and at in-
ternational meetings; 
h) promote regional coordination in areas of 
value-added services, equipment certification, 
technical standards and harmonisation of tar-
iffs; 
i) seek to harmonize the actions of Member 
States and Associate Members in the tele-
communications sector; 
j) foster co-operation and partnership between 
and among Member States and Associate 
Members; 
k) promote and encourage the exchange of in-
formation, expertise and technology relating 
to info-communications for the benefit of all 
Member States and Associate Members; 
l) undertake studies in the field of info-
communications for the benefit of Member 
States and Associate Members; and 
m) undertake all such activities not defined 
above which may assist in achieving the mis-
sion and vision of the Union (African Tele-
communications Union (ATU), 2001b). 
These objectives, while laudable, are too 
broad in scope. Clearly defined goals or bench-
marks and specific strategies to achieve them 
will make the organisation not only more effec-
tive, but also the benefits of membership more 
saleable. Achievements, too, can then be readily 
measured and it becomes easier to prioritise the 
areas that are still in need of improvement. The 
ATU needs to coordinate regional procurement 
of equipment, institute a continental universal 
service fund, and set targets for pay phone distri-
bution as well as other creative strategies to facil-
itate telephone access, such as tele-centers. In the 
absence of concrete, tangible objectives, the 
ATU will remain essentially ineffectual and 
merely a forum for proposing policies and stand-
ards. Its strategic plan, known as the African 
Connection, too, is written in general terms. 
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THE AFRICAN CONNECTION 
In August 1998 at the CPL held in Lusaka, Zam-
bia, the 44 member-states of the PATU, in ap-
proving resolution 07/6S-CPL/98, adopted the 
African Connection as its strategic plan for 
1998–2002. The annex to this resolution con-
cerns the ministerial oversight committee, which 
is open to all member states, and has a core 
group of 11 countries structured in accord with 
the AU's five-region division of the continent. 
Current members of this committee, which repre-
sent the ATU Plenipotentiary and an African 
Connection Project Trust and Secretariat, include 
Egypt and Libya for North Africa; Cameroon and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo for Cen-
tral Africa; Sudan and Uganda for East Africa; 
Gambia, Ghana, and Niger for West Africa; and 
Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa for 
Southern Africa (African Telecommunications 
Union (ATU), 1998). The Republic of South Af-
rica, which has largely spearheaded the initiative, 
serves as the chair of the ministerial oversight 
committee. 
While the African Connection, whose pro-
gram is being developed under the auspices of 
the ATU, does not outline a representative role 
for the regional economic organisations and per-
sists in employing the nation-state as the unit of 
representation, it does recognise that African pol-
icy-makers and businessmen need to go beyond 
individual country programmes and create re-
gional telecommunications markets. A Secretari-
at for the African Connection was established to 
create the requisite institutional support for man-
aging cross-country linkages and coordination, 
since the African Connection seeks to serve as a 
clearinghouse of information and first point of 
contact for regional regulatory framework devel-
opment. The African Connection also seeks to 
coordinate regional donor assistance and in so 
doing promote economies of scale on sub-
regional and regional levels (The African Con-
nection, 1999). The high level of African leader-
ship and support for the African Connection is 
noteworthy as is the positive response from bilat-
eral and multilateral lending institutions. The 
language of the document, however, as noted, is 
sufficiently vague in many respects to be effec-
tive. 
This is exemplified in the first chapter of the 
African Connection, entitled Special Programme 
for Least Developed Countries and Rural Tele-
communications Development, which states that 
the “promotion of universal access should be the 
driving [author's emphasis] force of change, 
while at the same time creating entrepreneurial 
opportunities at a local level” (African Tele-
communications Union (ATU), 1998). The doc-
ument seemingly contradicts itself, however, 
when stating that “[s]trategies that loop some 
LDCs and other countries into regional markets 
to ensure a critical mass that will interest inves-
tors to finance viable projects that guarantee a 
commercial return on investment while having 
some [author's emphasis] universal service or 
access obligations, need to be looked into” (Afri-
can Telecommunications Union (ATU), 1998). 
At no point, though, does the African Connection 
define universal access or propose how it should 
be achieved. Defining universal service policy 
objectives is, however, an integral part of the leg-
islative development process, for it empowers 
regulators to establish and enforce the mecha-
nisms for implementation of the policy. Without 
such definitions and guidelines, it is not possible 
to make any assessments of progress on a nation-
al or regional level. The African Connection also 
fails to provide critical information in regard to 
other areas. 
Regarding human resources, the inadequate 
funding and development of which is endemic to 
African institutions and undermines all institu-
tional endeavours, the third chapter of the Afri-
can Connection contends that creating a network 
of human resources at the national, regional and 
continental level is essential. To facilitate such 
networking and promote an information technol-
ogy culture, it recommends increased electronic 
meetings or communications between different 
government departments within the same country 
as well as constant periodic electronic communi-
cation between governments of different coun-
tries (African Telecommunications Union (ATU), 
1998). While this could assist in ensuring that 
knowledge and experience as well as perhaps 
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funding is shared, many government departments 
do not have access to the Internet or electronic 
mail. The African Connection does not specify 
how this initial impediment is to be remedied. 
In describing proposed projects in the areas 
of tele-medicine, tele-education and tele-
agriculture, the African Connection does not ad-
dress the fundamental question of resource allo-
cation, for the use of new communication tech-
nologies consumes funds that may be deemed 
more necessary elsewhere. For example, while 
some health care workers extol the satellite sys-
tems and computer networks that have brought 
them access to medical information, others de-
nounce the proclaimed advantages of tele-
medicine because no new knowledge about typi-
cal diseases which afflict Africa, such as diarrhea, 
tuberculosis, and cholera, can be derived from 
the consultation of medical databases (Afemann, 
1997). Most diseases in Africa are a result of 
malnutrition, inadequate housing, and generally 
poor, unsanitary living conditions. Not only can 
the Internet not solve these problems, it cannot 
provide desperately needed antibiotics, vaccines 
and syringes. It is essential to be ever mindful of 
the fact that the provision of information, while 
useful, even crucial, for many rural poor people 
is inadequate, the conditions and resources for 
the implementation of such information into 
practice must also be provided. The African 
Connection does not address this vital point, nor, 
as noted, does it set specific benchmarks and de-
tail strategies to achieve them, thus the African 
Connection is insufficient as a strategic plan for 
the ATU. The lack of sufficient details to imple-
ment an effective ICT programme also afflicts 
another recent African initiative, the New Part-
nership for Africa's Development or NEPAD. 
NEPAD 
Formed in 2001, NEPAD proposes four pro-
grammes as priorities to be addressed in the 
quest for development, including communicable 
diseases, specifically HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
tuberculosis; debt reduction; market access; and 
information and communication technology 
(ICT). In the ICT sector the NEPAD Task Team 
is known as the e-Africa Commission, which 
serves as the primary advisory body to the Heads 
of State and Government Implementation Com-
mittee of NEPAD on the development of an ef-
fective and comprehensive ICT programme in 
Africa. The NEPAD document, “The Strategy 
for Achieving Sustainable Development in the 
21st Century,” in recognising that Africa's poor 
ICT infrastructure constitutes a serious handicap 
to economic growth and poverty reduction, out-
lines five objectives with respect to information 
and communications technology: 
 
• to double teledensity to two lines per 100 
people by 2005, with an adequate level of ac-
cess for households; 
• to lower the cost of and improve reliability of 
service; 
• to achieve e-readiness for all countries in Af-
rica; 
• to develop and produce a pool of ICT-
proficient youth and students, from which 
Africa can draw trainee ICT engineers, pro-
grammers and software developers; 
• to develop local content software, based es-
pecially on Africa's cultural legacy (A New 
African Initiative, 2001). 
 
While these goals are commendable, the 
NEPAD document, like the Africa Connection, 
fails to articulate how these aspirations are to be 
realised. The NEPAD document stipulates five 
actions to be taken in regard to telecommunica-
tions: 
 
• work with regional agencies such as the ATU 
and Africa Connection to design model poli-
cy and legislation for telecommunications re-
form, and protocols and templates for e-
readiness assessments; 
• work with the regional agencies to build reg-
ulatory capacity; 
• establish a network of training and research 
institutions to build high-level man-power; 
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• promote and accelerate existing projects to 
connect schools and youth centres; 
• work with development finance institutions 
in Africa, multilateral initiatives (G-8 Dot-
Force, UN Task Force) and bilateral donors 
to establish financial mechanisms to mitigate 
and reduce sector risks legacy (A New Afri-
can Initiative, 2001). 
 
Not only is the level of generality at which 
these actions are stated problematic, there are 
other regional and continental agencies in Africa, 
such as the ATU, devoted to ICT development 
and the harmonization of policies in regard to the 
telecommunications sector. Such redundancy of 
effort on behalf of NEPAD is thus unproductive. 
To redress the widening digital chasm Africa 
faces, neither requires duplication nor overlap of 
action, but a decisive response on behalf on Afri-
can leaders to upgrade and expand the telecom-
munications sector in a coordinated manner at 
the regional level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The welfare of the people of Africa and the de-
velopment of an integrated regional economy 
requires the empowerment of regional organisa-
tions to achieve concerted and higher levels of 
coordinated regional institutions and actions. In 
the process of promoting intra-regional trade and 
supporting industrial development and growth, 
the upgrading and development of the telecom-
munications sector must remain a priority if Af-
rica is to redress its marginalization in an in-
creasingly integrated global economy. Given the 
disparate size and level of development of indi-
vidual African states, there is a clear need for a 
comprehensive and coordinated telecommunica-
tions policy at a regional and continental level to 
create markets which take advantage of econo-
mies of scale. Small market size in conjunction 
with perceived high country risks creates an en-
vironment adverse to investment in African 
states. A continental approach, as proposed by 
the ATU, has been identified and agreed to in 
various fora on the continent, principally because 
isolated country policy and regulatory reform has 
proven insufficient to advance the continent 
technologically. In harmonising a continental or 
‘African’ voice at global conferences, such as the 
ITU, the ATU can champion critical issues fac-
ing African states, such as in regard to spectrum 
allocation. 
The ATU, however, must address and resolve 
a wide variety of complex issues. In addition to 
market size and structure, the current diversity 
and inconsistency of regulatory regimes and the 
inability and high cost of securing information on 
the legal and regulatory frameworks in each 
country adversely affects investor confidence. 
The ATU is thus obliged to create a continental 
regulatory association, comprising the regional 
regulatory associations, to ensure uniform, well-
balanced and transparent regulatory structures. 
Clearly defined benchmarks must also be agreed 
upon and the strategies to achieve them imple-
mented. The ATU needs to build its base of pri-
vate participants and restructure its institutional 
framework to ensure more equitable distribution 
of costs and benefits among members. To pro-
mote regional telecommunications initiatives as 
well as advance the efforts of the AU toward in-
tegration, the ATU also needs to replace the in-
dividual nation states as members of the ATU 
with regional economic organisations. For as 
Nkrumah (1963) wrote, “just as our strength lies 
in a unified policy and action for progress and 
development, so the strength of the imperialists 
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